A. Bronson Alcott.

MAXIMS

No 23

AND

MORAL REFLECTIONS,

BY THE

DUKE DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULT.

A NEW EDITION,

REVISED AND IMPROVED.

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H. Bronson Alcott.

F. ALCOTT PRATT

PREFACE.

THE Public is here preſented with a new tranſlation of the MORAL MAXIMS of Francis the Sixth, Duke de la Rochefoucault: a performance of ſuch eſtimation, that its noble Author lived to ſee five or ſix editions of it; and ſince his death it has run through as many more; not to mention tranſlations. As far as the two languages permit, the tranſlator has followed, in the diſpoſition of the Maxims, the alphabetical order of Mr. Amelot de la Houſſaye: to whom he is alſo beholden for many well-collected authorities from the judicious Tacitus, and ſome other ancient writers. In

his

his own notes he has chiefly aimed at the explanation, or illuſtration, of his author's ſyſtem. He has rejected ſuch maxims as were manifeſt repetitions, or apparently ſpurious; and retained only ſuch as, after compariſon of the beſt editions, he concluded to be genuine. He has alſo taken great care to *expreſs the ſenſe of the original*, (in which the Engliſh tranſlations have been hitherto defective); and at the ſame time (what none of them have attempted) to do the Duke de la Rochefoucault the juſtice to make him *ſpeak Engliſh*.

1749.

To

TO THE PUBLIC.

THE eſteem in which the Duke de la Rochefoucault's Maxims is held, renders it unneceſſary to offer any apology for preſenting the public with the preſent edition. In juſtice, however, to the celebrated Author, the publiſher will take the liberty to ſubjoin the ſentiments of M. DE VOLTAIRE and LORD CHESTERFIELD. M. de Voltaire has not ſcrupled to aſſert, that theſe Maxims contributed more than any other work to form the taſte of the French nation, and give it a true reliſh for propriety and correctneſs. "Though," ſays he, "there "is but one truth running through the "whole piece, namely, that ſelf-love is "the ſpring of all our actions and deter-"minations; yet this thought preſents it-

"ſelf

" ſelf under ſuch a variety of forms, as
" never fail to ſtrike with new ſurpriſe.
" This little collection was much read and
" admired; it accuſtomed our authors to
" think, and to compriſe their thoughts
" in a lively, correct, and delicate turn
" of phraſe; which was a merit utterly
" unknown to any European writer be-
" fore him, ſince the revival of letters.
" His Memoirs * are ſtill read, and his
" Maxims *are known by heart* †"

The Earl of Cheſterfield in his Letters, lately publiſhed, ſays, " La Rochefou-
" cault is, I know, blamed, but I think
" without reaſon, for deriving all our
" actions from the ſource of ſelf-love.
" For my own part, I ſee a great deal
" of truth, and no harm at all in that
" opinion. It is ſufficient that we ſeek
" our own happineſs in every thing we
" do; and it is as certain that we can
" only find it in doing well, and in con-

* Mem. d'Anne d'Autriche.
† Siecle de Louis XIV.

" forming

" forming all our actions to the rule of " right reaſon, which is the great law of " nature. It is only a miſtaken ſelf-love " that is a bleamable motive, when we " take the immediate and indiſcriminate " gratification of a paſſion, or appetite, " for real happineſs. But am I blame- " able, if I do a good action upon ac- " count of the happineſs which that ho- " neſt conſciouſneſs will give me? Surely " not. On the contrary, that pleaſing " conſciouſneſs is a proof of my virtue, " &c. &c. *".—" Again, read in the " morning ſome of La Rochefoucault's " Maxims; conſider them, examine them " well, and compare them with the real " characters you meet in the evening †."—" Till you come to know mankind by " your own experience, I know nothing, " nor no man, that can, in the mean " time, bring you ſo well acquainted " with them as Le Duc de la Rochefou- " cault. His little book of Maxims,

* Letter 129. † Letter 225.

" which

" which I would adviſe you to look into,
" for ſome moments at leaſt, every day
" of your life, is, I fear, too like and too
" exact a picture of human nature. I
" own, it ſeems to degrade it, but yet my
" experience does not convince me that
" it degrades it unjuſtly *."

1775.

* Letter 173.

MAXIMS.

MAXIMS.

ABILITY.

I.

THE desire of appearing to be persons of ability often prevents our being so.

II.

Some weak people are so sensible of their weakness, as to be able to make a good use of it.

III.

The height of ability consists in a thorough knowledge of the *real* value of things, and of the *genius* of the age we live in.

IV.

It requires no small degree of ability to know when to conceal it *.

V.

Few men are able to know all the ill they do.

VI.

There are some affairs and distempers, which ill-timed remedies make worse; and great ability is requisite to know when it is dangerous to apply them.

* Claudius Cossus, ambassador from the Suisses, was a man of known eloquence, which he knew when to conceal: and he appeased a mutiny of the soldiery by feigning a panic. *Tacit.*

ACCENT.

VII.

The accent of a man's native country is as ſtrongly impreſſed on his mind, as on his tongue.

ACCIDENTS.

VIII.

No accidents are ſo unlucky, but that the prudent may draw ſome advantage from them: nor are there any ſo lucky, but what the imprudent may turn to their prejudice.

IX.

Accidents ſometimes happen from which a man cannot well extricate himſelf without a ſpice of madneſs.

ACTIONS.

X.

Great actions, the luſtre of which dazzles us, are repreſented by politicians as

the effects of deep deſign; whereas they are commonly the effects of caprice and paſſion. Thus the war between Auguſtus and Antony, ſuppoſed to be owing to their ambition to give a maſter to the world, aroſe probably from jealouſy *.

XI.

Men may boaſt of their great actions; but they are oftener the effect of chance, than of deſign.

XII.

Our actions may ſeem to be under the influence of good or bad ſtars, to which they owe the praiſe or blame they meet with.

XIII.

How brilliant ſoever an action may be, it ought not to paſs for *great* when it is not the effect of great deſign.

* Pliny the Hiſtorian ſays, that the Social War had its riſe from a private quarrel between Livius Druſus and Cæpio about a ring under ſale, for which they bid againſt one another. *Houſſaye.*

XIV.

XIV.

A certain proportion ſhould be obſerved between our deſigns and actions, if we would reap from them the advantage they might produce.

XV.

Our actions are like the jingle of rhyme, which every one repeats in his own manner.

XVI.

We ſhould often be aſhamed of our beſt actions, if the world were witneſs to the motives which produce them.

XVII.

To praiſe great actions with ſincerity, may be ſaid to be taking part in them.

ADVICE.

XVIII.

There is nothing of which we are ſo liberal as of advice.

XIX.

Nothing is leſs ſincere than our manner of aſking and of giving advice. He who aſks advice would ſeem to have a reſpectful deference for the opinion of his friend; whilſt yet he only aims at getting his own approved of, and his friend reſponſible for his conduct. On the other hand he who gives it, repays the confidence ſuppoſed to be placed in him by a ſeemingly diſintereſted zeal, whilſt he ſeldom means any thing by the advice he gives, but his own intereſt or reputation *.

XX.

There is near as much ability requiſite to know how to make uſe of good advice, as to know how to act for one's ſelf.

* Lord Shafteſbury, in his Soliloquy, ſays, "No "one was ever the better for advice: for that in "general what we called giving advice, was properly taking an occaſion to ſhew our own wiſ-"dom at another's expence; and to receive advice, "was little better than tamely to afford another "the occaſion of raiſing himſelf a character from "our defects."

XXI.

XXI.

We may give advice; but we cannot give conduct.

AFFECTATION.

XXII.

We are never made ſo ridiculous by the qualities we have, as by thoſe we affect to have.

XXIII.

We had better appear to be what we are, than affect to appear what we are not.

AFFLICTION.

XXIV.

Whatever we may pretend, intereſt and vanity are the uſual ſources of our afflictions.

XXV.

There are in affliction ſeveral kinds of hypocriſy. Under the pretence of weeping for the loſs of one who was dear to us, we weep for ourſelves: we weep over the diminution

minution of our fortune, of our pleaſure, of our importance. Thus have the dead the honour of tears which ſtream only for the living. I call this a ſort of hypocriſy, becauſe we impoſe on ourſelves. There is another hypocriſy, which is leſs innocent, becauſe it impoſes on the world. This is the affliction of ſuch as aſpire to the glory of a great and immortal ſorrow: when time, which conſumes all things, has worn out the grief which they really had, they ſtill perſiſt in their tears, lamentations, and ſighs. They aſſume a mournful behaviour; and labour, by all their actions, to demonſtrate that their affliction will not in the leaſt abate till death. This diſagreeable, this troubleſome vanity, is common among ambitious women. As the ſex bars all the paths to glory, they endeavour to render themſelves celebrated by the oſtentation of an inconſolable affliction. There is yet another ſpecies of tears, whoſe ſhallow ſprings eaſily overflow, and as eaſily dry away: we weep, to acquire the reputation of being tender; we weep

in

in order to be pitied; we weep, that we may be wept over; we even weep, to avoid the ſcandal of not weeping.

XXVI.

We ſometimes loſe friends whom we regret more than we grieve for; and others for whom we grieve, yet do not regret.

XXVII.

Moſt women lament not the death of their lovers ſo much out of real affection, as becauſe they would appear to be the more worthy of having been beloved.

AGE.

XXVIII.

Moſt people as they approach old age, ſhow in what manner their body and mind will decay *.

* To a ſkilful obſerver, the future defects of a man's mind and body may ſometimes be viſible from the time he is adult; as a good mechanic, from the accurate inſpection of a machine, may perhaps predict where it will decay.

XXIX.

XXIX.

We arrive novices at the different ages of life; and want experience, though we have had many years to gain it *.

AGREEABLENESS.

XXX.

We judge ſo ſuperficially of things, that common words and actions, ſpoke and done in an agreeable manner, with ſome knowledge of what paſſes in the world, often ſucceed beyond the greateſt ability †.

* Age does not neceſſarily confer experience; nor does even precept; nor any thing but an intercourſe and acquaintance with things. And we frequently ſee thoſe who have wanted opportunities to indulge their juvenile paſſions in youth, go preposterous lengths in old age, with all the ſymptoms of youth except ability.

† How often have I ſeen the moſt ſolid merit and knowledge neglected, unwelcome, and even rejected; while flimſy parts, little knowledge, and leſs merit, introduced by the Graces, have been received, cheriſhed, and admired!

Ld. Cheſterfield's Letters, (136th).

XXXI.

XXXI.

We may ſay of agreeableneſs, as diſtinct from beauty, that it is a ſymmetry whoſe rules are unknown; it is a ſecret conformity of the features to one another, to the complexion, to the carriage.

AMBITION.

XXXII.

The ambitious deceive themſelves in propoſing an end to their ambition; for that end, when attained, becomes a means.

XXXIII.

When great men ſuffer themſelves to be ſubdued by the length of their misfortunes, they diſcover that the ſtrength of their ambition, not of their underſtanding, was that which ſupported them. They diſcover too, that, allowing for a little vanity, heroes are juſt like other men.

XXXIV.

The greateſt ambition entirely conceals itſelf,

itſelf, when it finds that what it aſpired to is unattainable.

XXXV.

What ſeems to be generoſity is often no more than diſguiſed ambition; which overlooks little intereſts, in order to gratify great ones.

XXXVI.

Moderation muſt not claim the merit of combating and conquering ambition; for they can never exiſt in the ſame ſubject. Moderation is the languor and ſloth of the ſoul; ambition its activity and ardour.

XXXVII.

We paſs often from love to ambition: but we ſeldom return from ambition to love.

APPLICATION.

XXXVIII.

Thoſe who apply themſelves too much to little things, commonly become incapable of great ones.

XXXIX.

XXXIX.

Few things are impracticable in themſelves; and it is for want of application, rather than of means, that men fail of ſucceſs.

APPEARANCE.

XL.

In every profeſſion, every individual affects to appear what he would willingly be eſteemed: ſo that we may ſay, The world is compoſed of nothing but appearances.

AVARICE.

XLI.

Miſers miſtake gold for their good; whereas it is only a mean of attaining it *.

* That there is ſuch an irrational avarice as confines itſelf to the mere ſatisfaction ariſing from heaping up, looking at, and touching gold and ſilver, without any regard to their uſe, every age furniſhes us with too many examples, to admit a doubt.

XLII.

Avarice is more oppoſite to economy than liberality.

XLIII.

Extreme avarice almoſt always makes miſtakes. There is no paſſion that oftener miſſes its aim; nor on which the preſent has ſo much influence, in prejudice of the future.

XLIV.

Avarice often produces contrary effects. There are many people who ſacrifice their whole fortunes to dubious and diſtant expectations; there are others who contemn great future for little preſent advantages.

BENEFITS.

XLV.

We like better to ſee thoſe on whom we confer benefits, than thoſe from whom we receive them.

XLVI.

Men are not only apt to forget benefits and

and injuries; but even to hate thoſe who have obliged them, and to ceaſe to hate thoſe who have injured them. The very attention to requite kindneſſes, and revenge wrongs, ſeems to be an inſupportable ſlavery *.

XLVII.

Every body takes pleaſure in returning ſmall obligations; many go ſo far as to acknowledge moderate ones: but there is hardly any one who does not repay great obligations with ingratitude.

BUSINESS.

XLVIII.

The ruſt of buſineſs is ſometimes po-

* "To have received from one greater benefits "than there is hope to requite, diſpoſeth to coun- "terfeit love, but really to ſecret hatred; and puts "a man into the eſtate of a deſperate debtor, who, "in declining the ſight of his creditor, tacitly "wiſheth him there where he might never ſee "him more. For benefits oblige, and obligation is "thraldom, and unrequitable obligations perpetual "thraldom; which is hateful." Leviathan, p. 48.

liſhed off in a camp; but never in a court.

CIVILITY.

XLIX.

Civility is a deſire to receive civility, and to be accounted well-bred.

CLEMENCY.

L.

The clemency of princes is often policy, to gain the affection of their ſubjects.

LI.

That clemency we make a virtue of proceeds ſometimes from vanity, ſometimes from indolence, often from fear, and almoſt always from a mixture of all three.

CONDUCT.

LII.

That conduct often ſeems ridiculous, the

the ſecret reaſons of which are wiſe and ſolid *.

LIII.

A man often imagines he acts, when he is acted upon; and while his mind aims at one thing, his heart inſenſibly gravitates towards another.

* That of L. J. Brutus, for example, whoſe father and eldeſt brother Tarquin having murdered, he counterfeited himſelf a fool, in order to eſcape the ſame danger. Tarquin thinking his folly real, deſpiſed the man; and having poſſeſſed himſelf of his eſtate, kept him as an idiot, merely with a view of making ſport for his children. At the death of Lucretia, Brutus, happening to be preſent, threw off the maſk: he drew the poniard reeking from her wound, and lifting it up towards heaven; "Be witneſs, ye gods," he cried, "that from this "moment I proclaim myſelf the avenger of the "chaſte Lucretia's death; from this moment I pro-"feſs myſelf the enemy of Tarquin."—An amazement ſeized the hearers!—In the ſequel Tarquin was expelled, and Brutus was proclaimed deliverer of the people.

CONFIDENCE.

LIV.

In converſation confidence has a greater ſhare than wit.

LV.

The deſire of being pitied, or admired, is commonly the true reaſon of our confidence.

CONSTANCY.

LVI.

The conſtancy of the wife is only the art of keeping their diſquietudes to themſelves.

LVII.

We all bear the misfortunes of other people with an heroic conſtancy.

LVIII.

Criminals at their execution affect ſometimes a conſtancy, and contempt of death, which is, in fact, nothing more than the fear of facing it. Their conſtancy may be

be ſaid to be to the mind, what the fillet is to their eyes.

LIX.

Conſtancy in love is perpetual inconſtancy: it attaches us ſucceſſively to all the good qualities of the perſon beloved, giving ſometimes the preference to one, ſometimes to another. So that this conſtancy is no more than inconſtancy confined to a ſingle object.

LX.

In love there are two ſorts of conſtancy: one ariſes from our continually finding in the favourite object freſh motives to love; the other from our making it a point of honour to be conſtant.

LXI.

In misfortunes we often miſtake dejection for conſtancy: we bear them, without daring to look on them; as cowards ſuffer themſelves to be killed, without reſiſtance.

CON-

CONTEMPT.

LXII.

We ſometimes contemn the preſent by praiſing the paſt; we ſhew our contempt of what now is, by our eſteem for what is no more *.

LXIII.

None but the contemptible are apprehenſive of contempt.

CONVERSATION.

LXIV.

One reaſon why we meet with ſo few people who are reaſonable and agreeable in converſation is, that there is ſcarce any body who does not think more of what he has to ſay, than of anſwering what is ſaid to him. Even thoſe who have the moſt addreſs and politeneſs think they do enough if they only *ſeem* to be attentive; at the

* I believe there was ſuch a thing on earth as chaſtity in Saturn's reign, ſays Juvenal.

ſame

ſame time their eyes and their minds betray a diſtraction as to what is addreſſed to them, and an impatience to return to what they themſelves were ſaying: not reflecting that to be thus ſtudious of pleaſing themſelves is but a poor way of pleaſing or convincing others; and that to hear patiently, and anſwer preciſely, are the great perfections of converſation *.

COPIES.

LXV.

The only good copies are thoſe which point out the ridicule of bad originals.

* I muſt not omit one thing—which is attention: an attention never to be wholly engroſſed by any paſt or future object, but inſtantly to be directed to the preſent one, be it what it will—An abſent man can make but few obſervations—he can purſue nothing ſteadily, becauſe his abſences make him loſe his way. They are very diſagreeable, and hardly to be tolerated in old age; but in youth they cannot be forgiven."

Ld. Cheſterfield's Letters, (195th).

CO-

COQUETRY.

LXVI.

It is a ſort of coquetry, to boaſt that we never coquet.

LXVII.

All women are coquettes, though all do not practiſe coquetry; ſome are reſtrained by fear, ſome by reaſon.

LXVIII.

Women are not aware of the extent of their coquetry.

LXIX.

Women find it more difficult to get the better of their coquetry than of their love.

LXX.

The greateſt miracle of love is the reformation of a coquette.

LXXI.

We are always afraid of appearing before

fore the perſon we love when we have been coquetting elſewhere *.

LXXII.

Coquettes take a pride in appearing to be jealous of their lovers, in order to conceal their being envious of other women.

CRIMES.

LXXIII.

There are crimes which become innocent, and even glorious through their ſplendor, number, and exceſs: hence it is, that public theft is called addreſs; and to ſeize unjuſtly on provinces, to make conqueſts †.

* Coquettes are thoſe who ſtudiouſly excite the paſſion of love; though they mean nothing leſs than to gratify it. The male coquettes are near as numerous as the female.

† Power is the juſtice of ſovereigns: it is for private perſons to preſerve their own, but for princes to ſeize what belongs to others.

To ravage, plunder, and murder, is to reign; to deſolate a country, is to pacify it. *Tacit.*

LXXIV.

LXXIV.

We eaſily forget crimes that are known only to ourſelves *.

LXXV.

There are people of whom we never believe ill till we ſee it: but there are none we ought to be ſurpriſed at when we do ſee it.

LXXVI.

Thoſe who are themſelves incapable of great crimes are not ready to ſuſpect others of them.

CUNNING.

LXXVII.

The greateſt of all cunning is, to ſeem blind to the ſnares laid for us; men are

* Moſt people fancy themſelves innocent of thoſe crimes of which they cannot be convicted. *Senec.*

The Engliſh have a law maxim, *Nemo tenetur ſeipſum accuſare*, No man is legally compellable to accuſe himſelf.

never

never ſo eaſily deceived as while they are endeavouring to deceive others *.

LXXVIII.

Thoſe who have moſt cunning for ever affect to condemn cunning, that they may make uſe of it on ſome great occaſion, and to ſome great end.

LXXIX.

The common practice of cunning is no ſign of genius, it almoſt always happens that thoſe who uſe it to cover themſelves in one place, lay themſelves open in another.

LXXX.

Cunning and treachery proceed from want of capacity.

LXXXI.

The ſure way to be cheated is, to fancy ourſelves more cunning than others.

* The beſt defence againſt a ſecret enemy is, to make him believe you are not aware of his ſnares.

Tacit.

LXXXII.

We are angry with thoſe who trick us becauſe they appear to have more wit than ourſelves.

LXXXIII.

One man may be more cunning than another, but not more cunning than all the world.

LXXXIV.

Thoſe who are deceived by our cunning appear not near ſo ridiculous to us, as we ſeem to ourſelves when deceived by the cunning of others.

CURIOSITY.

LXXXV.

There are two kinds of curioſity. One ariſes from intereſt, which makes us deſirous to learn what may be uſeful to us; the

the other from pride, which makes us desire to know what others are ignorant of *.

DEATH.

LXXXVI.

Few people are well acquainted with death. It is generally ſubmitted to through ſtupidity and cuſtom, not reſolution: moſt men die merely becauſe they cannot help it.

LXXXVII.

Death and the ſun are not to be looked at ſteadily.

* "Curioſity," ſays Hobbes, "is a deſire to know "why and how; ſuch as is in no living creature but "man; ſo that man is diſtinguiſhed, not only by his "reaſon, but alſo by this ſingular paſſion, from "other animals; in whom the appetite of food, and "other pleaſures of ſenſe, by predominance, take "away the care of knowing cauſes; which is a "luſt of the mind, that by a perſeverance of de-"light in the continual and indefatigable gene-"ration of knowledge, exceedeth the ſhort vehe-"mence of any carnal pleaſure."

Leviathan, p. 26.

LXXXVIII.

After having ſpoken of the falſity of ſeeming virtues, it is proper to ſay ſomething about the falſity of the contempt of death: I mean that contempt of death which the heathens boaſted to derive from their natural ſtrength, unſupported by the hopes of a better life. There is a wide difference between ſuffering death courageouſly, and contemning it; the one is common enough; but the other, I believe, never ſincere. Every thing has been written that can perſuade us that death is no evil; and ſome of the weakeſt as well as the greateſt of men have given celebrated examples in confirmation of this tenet. Yet I doubt whether any perſon of good ſenſe ever believed it; and the pains we take to perſuade ourſelves and others of it plainly evince that it is no eaſy taſk. A man may, for many reaſons, be diſguſted with life; but he can have no reaſon for contemning death. Even ſuicides eſteem it no ſlight matter, and are as much ſtartled at it, and

declin-

decline it as much as other people, when it comes in any other ſhape except that which they have choſen. The remarkable inequality in the courage of many valiant men proceeds from death's appearing differently to their imaginations, and ſeeming more inſtant at one time than another. By this means it happens, that, after having condemned what they did not know, they are at laſt afraid of what they do know. We muſt avoid conſidering death in all its circumſtances, if we would not think it the greateſt of all ills. The wiſeſt and braveſt are thoſe who make the beſt pretences for not conſidering it at all: for every one that views it in its proper light will find it ſufficiently terrible. The neceſſity of dying made the whole of philoſophic fortitude. The philoſophers thought it beſt to do that with a good grace which was not to be avoided; and, being unable to make themſelves immortal, they did all they could to immortalize their reputations, and ſave what they might out of the general wreck. To be able to put a good face on the matter, let us by no means diſ-

cover even to ourſelves all we think about it; let us truſt rather to conſtitution, than to thoſe vain reaſonings which make us believe we can approach death with indifference. The glory of dying reſolutely, the hopes of being regretted, the deſire of leaving a fair reputation, the aſſurance of being delivered from the miſeries of life, and freed from the caprice of fortune, are alleviating reflections, not to be rejected: but we muſt by no means imagine them infallible. Theſe ſerve indeed to embolden us, juſt as in war a poor hedge emboldens the ſoldiers to approach an inceſſant firing. At a diſtance, they view it as a ſhelter; when they come up, they find it but a ſorry defence. We flatter ourſelves too much in fancying that death, when near, will appear what we judged it to be when diſtant; and that our opinions, which are weakneſs itſelf, will be firm enough not to give way on this ſevereſt of trials. We muſt alſo be but ill acquainted with the effects of ſelf-love, to imagine that *that* will permit us to think lightly of an action which

which muſt neceſſarily be its deſtruction. Reaſon, from whom we expect mighty aſſiſtance, is too feeble, on this occaſion, to make us believe what we wiſh to find true. It is ſhe, on the contrary, who betrays us; and, inſtead of inſpiring a contempt of death, helps only to diſcover its horrors. Indeed all ſhe can do for us is, to adviſe us to avert our eyes, and fix them on ſome other object. Cato and Brutus choſe noble ones. A footman, ſometimes ſince, amuſed himſelf with dancing upon the ſcaffold he was going to be broken on. Thus different motives ſometimes produce the ſame effect. And ſo true it is, that whatever diſproportion there may be, between the great and the vulgar, we often ſee them meet death with the ſame countenance: but there is always this difference, that the contempt of death ſhewn by heroes is owing to their love of glory, which hides it from their ſight; and in common people it proceeds merely from their want of ſenſibility, which prevents their being aware of the greatneſs

neſs of the evil, and leaves them at liberty to think of ſomething elſe *.

DECEIT.

LXXXIX.

To be deceived by our enemies, and betrayed by our friends, is not to be borne;

* The contempt of death has been always very juſtly accounted a virtue of the firſt claſs. Virgil makes it (as it truly is) eſſential to the character of a happy man.

" Quique metus omnes, & inexorabile fatum,
" Subjecit pedibus, ſtrepitumque Acherontis avari."

He muſt be ſuperior to every fear; even that of death, and its conſequences.—The fear of death is peculiar to man; and may perhaps be a neceſſary inſtinct to counterbalance reaſon, which might elſe, too frequently, prompt him to quit his poſt: according to that noble thought of Lucan.

" Victuroſque dei celant, ut vivere durent,
" Felix eſſe mori."

The gods conceal from men the happineſs of death, that they may endure life.

yet

yet are we often content to be ſerved ſo by ourſelves.

XC.

It is as eaſy to deceive ourſelves without *our* perceiving it, as it is difficult to deceive others without *their* perceiving it.

XCI.

A reſolution never to deceive expoſes a man to be deceived himſelf.

XCII.

Dulneſs is ſometimes a ſufficient ſecurity againſt the attack of an artful man.

XCIII.

He who imagines he can do without the world deceives himſelf much; but he who fancies the world cannot do without him, is ſtill more miſtaken.

XCIV.

In love, the deceit almoſt always outſtrips the diſtruſt.

XCV.

XCV.

We are ſometimes leſs unhappy in being deceived, than in being undeceived by thoſe we love.

XCVI.

Should even our friends deceive us, though we have a right to be indifferent to their profeſſions of friendſhip, we ought ever to retain a ſenſibility for their misfortunes.

DECENCY.

XCVII.

Decency is the leaſt of all laws, but the moſt ſtrictly obſerved.

DESIRE.

XCVIII.

It is much eaſier to ſuppreſs a firſt deſire, than to ſatisfy thoſe that follow.

XCIX.

XCIX.

Before we paſſionately wiſh for any thing, we ſhould examine into the happineſs of its poſſeſſor.

C.

Were we perfectly acquainted with the object, we ſhould never paſſionately deſire it *.

DISGUISE.

CI.

Were we to take as much pains to *be* what we ought, as we do to diſguiſe what we *are*, we might appear like ourſelves, without being at the trouble of any diſguiſe at all.

CII.

We were ſo uſed to diſguiſe ourſelves to others, that at laſt we become diſguiſed even to ourſelves.

* Sir Thomas More ſays, "the world is undone "by looking at things at a diſtance."

CIII.

CIII.

Some diſguiſed falſehoods are ſo like truths, that it would be judging ill not to be deceived by them.

DISTRUST.

CIV.

Our own diſtruſt juſtifies the deceit of others *.

CV.

That which commonly hinders us from ſhewing the openneſs of our hearts to friends, is not ſo much a diſtruſt of them, as of ourſelves.

CVI.

Whatever diſtruſt we may have of the ſincerity of other people, we always believe

* Many men provoke others to over-reach them by exceſſive ſuſpicion; their extraordinary diſtruſt in ſome ſort juſtifying the deceit. *Senec.* ep. iii.

that

that they are more ingenuous with ourſelves than any body elſe.

EASE.

CVII.

A man who finds not ſatisfaction in himſelf ſeeks for it in vain elſewhere.

EDUCATION.

CVIII.

Common education inſtils into young people a ſecond ſelf-love.

ELOQUENCE.

CIX.

There is as much eloquence in the tone of voice, in the look, and in the geſture of an orator, as in the choice of his words *.

CX.

* "The receipt to make a ſpeaker, and an applauded one too, is ſhort and eaſy. Take common ſenſe *quantum ſufficit*, add a little application to the rules and orders of the Houſe [of Commons],

CX.

True eloquence conſiſts in ſaying all that is proper, and nothing more.

EMPLOYMENT.

CXI.

It is eaſier to appear worthy of the employments we are not poſſeſſed of, than of thoſe we are.

CXII.

We may appear great in an employment below our merit; but we often appear little in one that is too high for us.

" throw obvious thoughts in a new light, and " make up the whole with a large quantity of pu- " rity, correctneſs, and elegancy of ſtyle. Take " it for granted that by far the greateſt part of " mankind neither analyſe nor ſearch to the bot- " tom; they are incapable of penetrating deeper " than the ſurface." Ld. Cheſterf. Lett. (272d)

" The manner of your ſpeaking is full as im- " portant as the matter, as more people have ears " to be tickled than underſtandings to judge."

Id. Lett. 197th.

ENVY.

ENVY.

CXIII.

Thoſe who endeavour to imitate us we like much better than thoſe who endeavour to equal us. Imitation is a ſign of eſteem but competition of envy.

CXIV.

We often glory in the moſt criminal paſſions; but the paſſion of envy is ſo ſhameful, that we never dare to own it.

CXV.

Jealouſy is, in ſome ſort, rational and juſt; it aims at the preſervation of a good which belongs, or which at leaſt we think belongs to us; whereas envy is a frenzy, that cannot bear the good of others.

CXVI.

Our approbation of thoſe who are entering upon the world is often owing to a ſecret envy of thoſe who are well ſettled in it.

CXVII.

Pride, which excites envy, often helps us to moderate it.

CXVIII.

Envy is more irreconcileable than hatred.

CXIX.

Envy is deſtroyed by true friendſhip, and coquetry by true love.

CXX.

Our envy always outlives the felicity of its object.

CXXI.

More people are free from intereſt, than from envy.

EXAMPLE.

CXXII.

Nothing is ſo contagious as example: never is any conſiderable good or ill done that

that does not produce its like. We imitate good actions through emulation; and bad ones through a malignity in our nature, which ſhame concealed, and example ſets at liberty.

FAMILIARITY.

CXXIII.

Familiarity is a ſuſpenſion of almoſt all the laws of civility; libertiniſm has introduced it into ſociety under the notion of eaſe.

FAVOURITES.

CXXIV.

The hatred of favourites is nothing more than the love of favour. Our indignation at not poſſeſſing it ourſelves is ſoothed and mitigated by the contempt we expreſs for thoſe who do; and we refuſe them our homage, becauſe we are not able to deprive them of that which procures them the homage of every one elſe.

FAULTS.

CXXV.

We need not be much concerned about thoſe faults which we have the courage to own.

CXXVI.

We acknowledge our faults, in order to repair by ſincerity, the hurt they do us in the opinion of others.

CXXVII.

We confeſs ſmall faults in order to inſinuate that we have no great ones.

CXXVIII.

A great genius will ſincerely acknowledge his defects as well as his perfections: it is a weakneſs not to own the ill as well as the good that is in us.

CXXIX.

Had we no faults ourſelves, we ſhould take leſs pleaſure in obſerving thoſe of others.

CXXX.

CXXX.

We are often more agreeable through our faults, than through our good qualities.

CXXXI.

The greateſt faults are thoſe of Great Men.

CXXXII.

Diſhoneſt men conceal their faults from themſelves as well as others: honeſt men know and confeſs them.

CXXXIII.

There are ſome faults which, when well managed, make a greater figure than virtue itſelf.

CXXXIV.

We are not bold enough to ſay in general that we have no faults, and that our enemies have no good qualities; but in particulars we ſeem to think ſo.

CXXXV.

CXXXV.

We have few faults that are not more excuſeable in themſelves than the means we uſe to conceal them.

CXXXVI.

We boaſt of faults that are the oppoſites to thoſe we really have; thus, if we are irreſolute, we glory in being thought obſtinate.

CXXXVII.

We eaſily excuſe in our friends thoſe faults that do not affect us.

CXXXVIII.

We endeavour to get reputation by thoſe faults we determine not to amend.

CXXXIX.

It ſeems as if men thought they had not faults enow, for they increaſe their number by certain affected ſingularities; theſe are cultivated ſo carefully, that at laſt

laſt they become natural defects, beyond their power to reform.

FEAR.

CXL.

Few cowards know the extent of their fears.

FIDELITY.

CXLI.

The fidelity of moſt men is one of the arts of ſelf-love, to procure confidence. It is the means to raiſe us above others, by making us the depoſitaries of momentous concerns.

CXLII.

It is more difficult to be faithful to a miſtreſs when on good terms with her, than when on bad.

FLAT-

FLATTERY.

CXLIII.

We ſhould have but little pleaſure were we never to flatter ourſelves.

CXLIV.

Did we not flatter ourſelves, the flattery of others could never hurt us *.

CXLV.

Flattery is a ſort of bad money, to which our vanity gives currency.

CXLVI.

Men ſometimes think they hate flattery; but they hate only the manner of it.

FOLLY.

CXLVII.

Folly attends us cloſe through life. If

* People flatter us, becauſe they can depend on our credulity. *Tacit.*

any

any one ſeems to be wiſe, it is merely becauſe his follies are proportionate to his age and fortune.

CXLVIII.

He who lives without folly is not ſo wiſe as he imagines.

CXLIX.

As we grow old, we grow more fooliſh and more wiſe.

CL.

It is great folly to affect to be wiſe by one's ſelf.

CLI.

Some follies are like contagious diſtempers.

CLII.

Old fools are more fooliſh than young ones.

CLIII.

There are people fated to be fools; they not

not only commit follies by choice, but are even conſtrained to do ſo by fortune.

CLIV.

No fools are ſo troubleſome as thoſe who have ſome wit.

FORTUNE.

CLV.

Whatever difference may appear in mens fortunes, there is nevertheleſs a certain compenſation of good and ill, that makes all equal *.

CLVI.

Fortune turns every thing to the advantage of her favourites.

CLVII.

The happineſs and miſery of men depend no leſs on temper than fortune.

* A great fortune runs great riſques; a moderate one is ſecure. *Tacit.*

Many who ſeem wretched are happy; and many are miſerable in the midſt of riches. *Id.*

CLVIII.

CLVIII.

Fortune breaks us of many faults which reaſon cannot.

CLIX.

The generality of people judge of us by our reputation, or fortune.

CLX.

To be great, we muſt know how to puſh our fortune to the utmoſt.

CLXI.

Fortune exhibits our virtues and vices, as the light ſhews objects.

CLXII.

Fortune is ever deemed blind by thoſe on whom ſhe beſtows no favours.

CLXIII.

To be able to anſwer for what we ſhall certainly do, we ſhould be able to anſwer for our fortune.

CLXIV.

We ſhould manage our fortune like our

conſtitution; enjoy it when good, have patience when bad, and never apply violent remedies but in caſes of neceſſity.

CLXV.

Fortune and caprice govern the world.

FRIENDSHIP.

CLXVI.

What is commonly called friendſhip is no more than a partnerſhip; a reciprocal regard for one another's intereſts, and an exchange of good offices; in a word, a mere traffic, wherein ſelf-love always propoſes to be a gainer.

CLXVII.

Though moſt of the friendſhips of the world ill deſerve the name of friendſhips; yet a man may make uſe of them occaſionally, as of a traffic whoſe returns are uncertain, and in which it is uſual to be cheated.

CLXVIII.

In the diſtreſs of our beſt friends we always

ways find ſomething that does not diſpleaſe us *.

CLXIX.

The reaſon we are ſo changeable in our friendſhips is, that it is difficult to know the qualities of the heart, and eaſy to know thoſe of the head.

* This maxim gave occaſion to the celebrated *Verſes on the death of Dr. Swift.* The introductory lines of the poem give the Dean's opinion of our author, and a poetical verſion of the maxim. They are as follows:

As Rochefoucault his maxims drew
From nature, I believe them true:
They argue no corrupted mind
In him: the fault is in mankind.
This maxim, more than all the reſt,
Is thought too baſe for human breaſt:
"In all diſtreſſes of our friends,
"We firſt conſult our private ends;
"While Nature, kindly bent to eaſe us,
"Points out ſome circumſtance to pleaſe us."
Swift, Vol. VI.

See alſo Lord Cheſterfield's defence of this maxim. Letter 129th.

CLXX.

We love nothing but on our own account, and only follow our taſte and inclination when we prefer our friends to ourſelves; and yet it is this preference that alone conſtitutes true and perfect friendſhip.

CLXXI.

It is more diſhonourable to diſtruſt a friend, than to be deceived by him.

CLXXII.

We often imagine we love men in power; but intereſt alone is the true reaſon of our friendſhip for them: we eſpouſe not their party to do them good, but from their hands to receive good.

CLXXIII.

Self-love magnifies, or diminiſhes, the good qualities of our friends, in proportion to the ſatisfaction we take in them: and we judge of their merit by the terms they keep with us.

CLXXIV.

CLXXIV.

We ſometimes lightly complain of our friends, to be beforehanded in juſtifying our own levity.

CLXXV.

We are not much afflicted at the misfortunes of our friends, when they give us an opportunity of ſignalizing our affection for them.

CLXXVI.

We are fond of exaggerating the love our friends bear us; but it is often leſs from a principle of gratitude, than the deſire of prejudicing people in favour of our own merit.

CLXXVII.

We always love thoſe who admire *us*; but we do not always love thoſe whom *we* admire.

CLXXVIII.

Rare as true love is, it is leſs ſo than true friendſhip.

CLXXIX.

The reaſon why few women give into friendſhip is, that friendſhip is inſipid to thoſe who have experienced love.

CLXXX.

In friendſhip, as in love, we are often happier through our ignorance, than knowledge.

CLXXXI.

It is very difficult to love thoſe we do not eſteem; and it is at leaſt as difficult to love thoſe whom we eſteem much more than we do ourſelves.

CLXXXII.

We are much nearer loving thoſe who hate us, than thoſe who love us more than we deſire.

CLXXXIII.

The greateſt effort of friendſhip is, not the diſcovery of our faults to a friend, but the endeavouring to make him ſee his own.

CLXXXIV.

CLXXXIV.

The charm of novelty, and long habit, oppoſite as they are, equally conceal from us the faults of our friends.

CLXXXV.

The generality of friends put us out of conceit with friendſhip; as the generality of religious people put us out of conceit with religion.

CLXXXVI.

Nothing is more natural, nor more fallacious, than a belief that we are beloved.

CLXXXVII.

Renewed friendſhips require more conduct than thoſe that have never been broken.

GALLANTRY.

CLXXVIII.

Though there are many women who never have had one intrigue; there are ſcarce any who have had no more than one.

CLXXXIX.

CLXXXIX.

We ſeldom talk of a woman's firſt intrigue before ſhe has had a ſecond.

CXC.

Love is the ſmalleſt part of gallantry.

GLORY.

CXCI.

The glory of great men ought always to be rated according to the means uſed to acquire it.

CXCII.

We exalt the reputation of ſome, to depreſs that of others; nor ſhould we always extol ſo much the prince of Conde and Marſhal Turenne, had we not a mind to blame both.

CXCIII.

It is as commendable to be proud with reſpect to one's ſelf, as ridiculous to be ſo with reſpect to others *.

* One of Pythagoras's precepts was, Παντων δε μαλιστα αισχυνου σ' αυτου: "Above all things "reverence yourſelf."

CXCIV.

CXCIV.

We are unwilling to loſe our lives, and yet would fain acquire glory. Hence it is, that the brave uſe more dexterity to avoid death, than men verſed in the chicanery of law do to preſerve their eſtates.

GOODNESS.

CXCV.

Nothing is more rare than true goodneſs: even thoſe who imagine they poſſeſs it having nothing more than complaiſance, or weakneſs.

CXCVI.

It is very difficult to diſtinguiſh diffuſive general goodneſs from great addreſs.

CXCVII.

None deſerve the name of good, who have not ſpirit enough, at leaſt, to be bad: goodneſs being for the moſt part but indolence, or impotence *.

* Caprice is alſo, as Mr. Pope has obſerved, ſometimes a ſource of goodneſs;

"And made a widow happy for a whim."

CXCVIII.

CXCVIII.

A fool has not ſtuff enough to make a good man.

CXCIX.

Reſolute people alone can be truly good-natured; ſuch as commonly ſeem ſo are weak and eaſily foured.

GOOD SENSE.

CC

Good ſenſe ſhould be the teſt of all rules, both ancient and modern: whatever is incompatible with good ſenſe is falſe.

GOVERN.

CCI.

It it more difficult to prevent being governed, than to govern others *.

* Tacitus ſays of Agricola, that he governed his family; which many find a harder taſk than to govern a province.

GREAT

GREAT MEN.

CCII.

Since great men *cannot* beſtow health of body, nor peace of mind, we certainly pay too dear for all that they *can* beſtow.

GRAVITY.

CCIII.

Gravity is a myſterious carriage of the body, invented to cover the defects of the mind *.

* "The Duke de Rochefoucault's definition of "gravity," ſays Sterne, "deſerves to be written in "letters of gold."—Yorick had been ſpeaking to "this effect:—Gravity is an errant ſcoundrel, and "of the moſt dangerous kind too, becauſe a ſly one; "and more honeſt well-meaning people are bubbled "out of their goods and money by it in one twelve-"month, than by pocket-picking and ſhop-lifting "in ſeven. The very eſſence of gravity is deſign, "and conſequently deceit: a taught trick to gain "credit of the world for more ſenſe and knowledge "than a man is worth."

Triſt. Shand. Vol. I. ch. xi.

"Gravity is of the very eſſence of impoſture."

Shafteſ. Charact. Vol. I. p. 11.

GRACE

GRACE.

CCIV.

A good grace is to the body what good ſenſe is to the mind *.

GREEDINESS.

CCV.

An able man will arrange his intereſts, and conduct each in its proper order. Our greedineſs often hurts us, by making us proſecute ſo many things at once; by too earneſtly deſiring the leſs conſiderable, we loſe the more important.

* "They are both the gifts of nature; but they "may be cultivated, increaſed, and brought to per- "fection. Adorn yourſelf with all thoſe graces and "accompliſhments which without ſolidity are frivo- "lous; but without which, ſolidity is to a great de- "gree uſeleſs."

Ld. Cheſterf. Lett. (182d).

GRATITUDE.

CCVI.

It is with gratitude as with honeſty among traders, it helps to carry on buſineſs; and we pay, not becauſe we ought, but in order to find eaſier credit another time.

CCVII.

Not all who diſcharge their debts of gratitude ſhould flatter themſelves that they are grateful.

CCVIII.

The reaſon of the miſreckoning in expected returns of gratitude is, that the pride of the giver and receiver can never agree about the value of the obligation.

CCIX.

There is a certain warmth of gratitude, which not only acquits us of favours received, but even, while we are repaying our friends what we owed, makes them our debtors.

CCX.

The gratitude of moſt men is only a ſecret deſire to receive greater favours.

HAPPINESS.

CCXI.

None are either ſo happy or ſo unhappy as they imagine.

CCXII.

We take leſs pains to *be* happy, than to *appear* ſo.

CCXIII.

Happineſs is in the taſte; not in the thing; and we are made happy by poſſeſſing what we ourſelves love, not what others think lovely.

HATRED.

CCXIV.

When our hatred is violent, it ſinks us even beneath thoſe we hate *.

* Tacitus ſays, That men hate thoſe they injure: And the Italian Maxim is, "Chi offende non perdona mai:" Thoſe who injure you, never forgive you.

HEART.

CCXV.

Every body ſpeaks well of his heart, but no one dares to ſpeak well of his head.

CCXVI.

Men are ſometimes well acquainted with their head, when they are not ſo with their heart.

CCXVII.

The head is always the dupe of the heart*.

CCXVIII.

The head cannot long act the part of the heart.

* Many could have ſaid in a round period, that whatever reflections the mind may make, and whatever reſolutions it may take to reform its irregularities, the firſt motion of the heart overturns all its projects. But the Duke de la Rochefoucault alone can ſay all this in a word, "the head is always the "dupe of the heart." *Bouhours l'Art de Penſer.*

CCXIX.

The imagination cannot invent so many contrarieties as are naturally in the heart of man.

HEROES.

CCXX.

Nature may give very great advantages; but she must have the concurrence of fortune to make heroes.

CCXXI.

There are heroes in ill, as well as in good.

HONOUR.

CCXXII.

One acquired honour is surety for more.

HOPE.

CCXXIII.

Hope, deceitful as it is, carries us agreeably through life *.

* It does more; it extends its influence beyond the grave; and helps to reconcile us to the stroke of death.

"Hope travels thro' nor quits us when we die."
Pope.

HUMOUR.

HUMOUR.

CCXXIV.

Our own caprice is more extravagant than the caprice of fortune.

CCXXV.

Fancy ſets the value on the gifts of fortune.

CCXXVI.

Our humour is more in fault than our underſtanding.

CCXXVII.

We may ſay of the temper of men, as of moſt buildings, that it has ſeveral aſpects; of which ſome are very agreeable, ſome diſagreeable.

CCXXVIII.

The humours of the body have a regular ſtated courſe which inſenſibly influences the will; they circulate, and ſucceſſively exerciſe a ſecret power over us. In ſhort,

they have a conſiderable ſhare in all our actions, though we perceive it not.

CCXXIX.

Madmen and fools ſee every thing through the medium of humour.

CCXXX.

The calm or diſquiet of our temper depends not ſo much on affairs of moment, as on the diſpoſition of the trifles that daily occur.

HYPOCRISY.

CCXXXI.

Hypocriſy is the homage that vice pays to virtue.

IDLENESS.

CCXXXII.

It is a miſtake to imagine, that the violent paſſions only, ſuch as ambition and love, can triumph over the reſt. Idleneſs, languid as it is, often maſters them all; ſhe indeed

indeed influences all our designs and actions, and insensibly consumes and destroys both passions and virtues.

CCXXXIII.

Idleness, timidity, and shame, often keep us within the bounds of duty; whilst virtue seems to run away with the honour.

CCXXXIV.

Idleness is more in the mind than in the body.

JEALOUSY.

CCXXXV.

Under some circumstances it may not be disagreeable to a man to have a jealous wife; for she will always be talking of what pleases him.

CCXXXVI.

Only such persons who avoid giving jealousy are deserving of it.

CCXXXVII.

CCXXXVII.

Jealouſy is always born with love, but does not always die with it.

CCXXXVIII.

Jealouſy is nouriſhed by doubt; it either becomes madneſs, or ceaſes as ſoon as we arrive at certainty.

CCXXXIX.

In jealouſy there is leſs love than ſelf-love *.

CCXL.

There is a ſpecies of love whoſe exceſs prevents jealouſy.

CCXLI.

Jealouſy is the greateſt of evils, and the leaſt pitied by thoſe who occaſion it.

* Witneſs Rhadamiſtus, who threw his beloved wife into a river, that ſhe might not fall into the hands of another. *Tacit.*

ILLS.

ILLS.

CCXLII.

Philoſophy eaſily triumphs over paſt and future ills; but *preſent* ills triumph over philoſophy.

CCXLIII.

The good we have received from a man ſhould make us bear with the ill he does us.

CCXLIV.

It is leſs dangerous to do ill to moſt men, than to do them too much good *.

CCXLV.

A readineſs to believe ill without examination is the effect of pride and lazineſs. We are willing to find people guilty, and unwilling to be at the trouble of examining into the accuſation.

* When benefits are ſuch as can never be repaid, the benefactor is uſually hated inſtead of thanked. *Tacit.*

CCXLVI.

CCXLVI.

Weakneſs often gets the better of thoſe ills which reaſon could not.

INCONSTANCY.

CCXLVII.

There is an inconſtancy that proceeds from the levity or weakneſs of the mind, which makes it give into every one's opinions: and there is another inconſtancy, more excuſeable, which ariſes from ſatiety.

INGRATITUDE.

CCXLVIII.

An extraordinary haſte to diſcharge an obligation is a ſort of ingratitude.

CCXLIX.

There are ſome ungrateful people who are leſs to be blamed for their ingratitude than their benefactors.

CCL.

We ſeldom find people ungrateful ſo long

long as we are in a condition to ſerve them.

CCLI.

It is no great misfortune to oblige ungrateful people, but an inſupportable one to be forced to be under an obligation to a ſcoundrel.

INFIDELITY.

CCLII.

Women in love more eaſily forgive great indiſcretions than ſmall infidelities.

CCLIII.

We find it more difficult to overlook the leaſt infidelity to ourſelves than the greateſt to others.

INNOCENCE.

CCLIV.

Innocence finds not near ſo much protection as guilt.

INTE-

INTEREST.

CCLV.

Intereſt ſpeaks all languages, and acts all parts, even that of *diſintereſtedneſs* itſelf.

CCLVI.

Intereſt, which blinds ſome people, enlightens others.

CCLVII.

The name of virtue is as ſerviceable to intereſt as vice.

CCLVIII.

Intereſt puts in motion all the virtues and vices.

CCLIX.

Good-nature, that boaſter of its great ſenſibility, is often ſtifled by the ſmalleſt intereſt.

CCLX.

We condemn vice, and extol virtue, merely through intereſt.

CCLXI.

CCLXI.

It is only in little intereſts that we uſually venture to diſbelieve appearances.

INTREPIDITY.

CCLXII.

Intrepidity is an extraordinary ſtrength of ſoul, that renders it ſuperior to the trouble, diſorder, and emotion, which the apearance of danger is apt to excite. By this quality heroes maintain their tranquillity, and preſerve the free uſe of their reaſon, in the moſt ſurprizing and dreadful accidents.

JUDGMENT.

CCLXIII.

Every one complains of the badneſs of his memory, but nobody of his judgment.

JUSTICE.

CCLXIV.

The love of juſtice in moſt men, is the fear of ſuffering by injuſtice.

KNOWLEDGE.

CCLXV.

To know things well, we ſhould know them in detail; and as that is in a manner infinite, our knowledge is always ſuperficial and imperfect.

LIBERALITY.

CCLXVI.

What we call liberality is ſeldom more than the vanity of giving; we are fonder of the vanity than the generoſity of the action.

LOVE.

CCLXVII.

No diſguiſe can long *conceal* love where it is, nor *feign* it where it is not.

CCLXVIII.

CCLXVIII.

Since it is not in our power to love any more than to let it alone, a lover has no right to complain of his miſtreſs's inconſtancy, nor ſhe of her lover's levity.

CCLXIX.

It is difficult to define love; we may ſay of it, however, that in the ſoul it is a deſire to reign, in minds it is a ſympathy, and in bodies a ſecret inclination to enjoy what we love after many difficulties *.

CCLXX.

To judge of love by moſt of its effects, one would think it more like hatred than kindneſs.

* This is ſurely but a dark confuſed account of love; and hardly will any one cry out after having read it, *Nunc ſcio quid ſit amor*. Mr. Hobbes has thus defined it in much fewer words: It is," ſays he, "the love of one ſingularly, with deſire to be ſingularly beloved. And the ſame, with fear that "the love is not mutual, is jealouſy." *Leviathan*.

CCLXXI.

There are few people who are not aſhamed of their amours when the fit is over.

CCLXXII.

There is only one ſort of love, but there are a thouſand different copies of it.

CCLXXIII.

Love, like fire, cannot ſubſiſt without continual motion; it ceaſes to exiſt, as ſoon as it ceaſes to hope or fear.

CCLXXIV.

Love lends his name to many a correſpondence wherein he is no more concerned than the doge in what is done at Venice.

CCLXXV.

The more you love your miſtreſs, the readier you are to hate her.

CCLXXVI.

CCLXXVI.

To love is the leaſt fault of the woman who has abandoned herſelf to love *.

CCLXXVII.

There are people who would never have been in love, had they never heard talk of it.

CCLXXVIII.

The pleaſure of loving is, to love; and we are much happier in the paſſion we feel, than in that we excite.

CCLXXIX.

To fall in love is much eaſier than to get rid of it.

* Single vices make men commit ſingle crimes; but one vice makes women guilty of all. And the reaſon of it is, the general contempt and ill-uſage that cuſtom has made the conſequence of the forfeiture of female virtue. For women, finding themſelves irrecoverably undone by ſuch a ſlip, and treated as if nothing could be added to their guilt, ſtick afterwards at no one crime, becauſe they know they are thought capable of all.

CCLXXX.

Novelty to love is like the bloom to fruit: it gives a luſtre, which is eaſily effaced, but never returns.

CCLXXXI.

It is impoſſible to love thoſe a ſecond time whom we have really ceaſed to love.

CCLXXXII.

We forgive as long as we love.

CCLXXXIII.

In love, we often doubt of what we moſt believe.

CCLXXXIV.

The man who thinks he loves his miſtreſs for *her* ſake is much miſtaken.

CCLXXXV.

Young women who would not appear coquets, and old men who would not be ridiculous, ſhould never ſpeak of love as of a thing that in any ways concerns them.

CCLXXXVI.

CCLXXXVI.

A woman keeps her firſt lover long, if ſhe happens not to take a ſecond.

CCLXXXVII.

In love, thoſe who are *firſt* cured are *beſt* cured.

CCLXXXVIII.

All the paſſions make us commit faults; but love makes us guilty of the moſt ridiculous ones.

CCLXXXIX.

In the old age of love, as in that of life, we continue to live to pain, though we ceaſe to live to pleaſure.

CCXC.

There are many cures for love; but not one of them infallible.

CCXCI.

Love, all agreeable as he is, pleaſes yet more by the manner in which he ſhews himſelf.

CCXCII.

CCXCII.

A lover never ſees the faults of his miſtreſs till the enchantment is over.

MAGNANIMITY.

CCXCIII.

Magnanimity contemns all, to obtain all.

CCXCIV.

Magnanimity is ſufficiently defined by its name; yet we may ſay of it, that it is the good ſenſe of pride, and the nobleſt way of acquiring applauſe.

MAN.

CCXCV.

To ſtudy men, is more neceſſary than to ſtudy books *.

CCXCVI.

* The proper ſtudy of mankind is man," ſays Mr. Pope.—" Learning," ſays Lord Cheſterfield, " is acquired by reading books; but the more neceſ-

" ſary

CCXCVI.

Men and things have their particular point of view: to judge of ſome we ſhould ſee them near; of others we judge beſt at a diſtance.

CCXCVII.

The truly honeſt man is he who valueth not himſelf on any thing.

CCXCVIII.

He muſt be a truly honeſt man who is willing to be always open to the inſpection of honeſt men.

" ſary learning, the knowledge of the world, is on-
" ly to be acquired by reading men, and ſtudying all
" the various editions of them." Again, " All
" are in general, and yet no two in particular, exactly
" alike. Thoſe who have not accurately ſtudied,
" perpetually miſtake: they do not diſcern the ſhades
" and gradations that diſtinguiſh characters ſeemingly
" alike, &c. &c." Lett. 243d. " Let the great
" book of the world be your principal ſtudy."
Lett. 217th.

CCXCIX.

CCXCIX.

A man of ſenſe may love like a madman, but never like a fool.

MARRIAGE.

CCC.

There are convenient marriages, but no happy ones.

MEMORY.

CCCI.

Why have we memory ſufficient to retain the minuteſt circumſtances that have happened to us; and yet not enough to remember how often we have related them to the ſame perſon?

MERIT.

CCCII.

Thoſe who think themſelves perſons of merit, take a pride often in being unlucky, in order to make themſelves and others believe

believe that they are worthy to be the butt of fortune.

CCCIII.

To undeceive a perſon prejudiced in favour of his merit, is to do him the ſame bad office that was done to the madman at Athens, who fancied all the veſſels that came into the port to be his own *.

CCCIV.

It is a ſign of an extraordinary merit, when thoſe who moſt envy it are forced to praiſe it.

CCCV.

Nature gives merit, and fortune ſets it to work.

* This noble Athenian, when recovered from his indiſpoſition, declared that he never had more pleaſure than whilſt he was diſtempered, which he remembered well. Adding, that his friends would have obliged him much, to have let him enjoy a happineſs that put him in poſſeſſion of all things, without depriving any body of the leaſt.

Ælian tells this ſtory, and calls him Thraſyllus.

CCCVI.

CCCVI.

Some people are diſguſting with great merit; others with great faults very pleaſing *.

CCCVII.

There are people whoſe whole merit conſiſts in ſaying and doing fooliſh things ſeaſonably. An alteration of conduct would ſpoil all.

CCCVIII.

The art of ſetting off moderate qualifications ſteals eſteem; and often gives more reputation than real merit †.

* There are odious virtues, ſuch as inflexible ſeverity, and integrity that admits of no favour. *Tacit.*

† Poppæus Sabinus, of moderate birth, obtained the conſulſhip, and the honour of a triumph; and governed for four and twenty years the greateſt provinces, without any extraordinary merit; being juſt capable of his employments, and in no manner above them. *Tacit.*

CCCIX.

CCCIX.

Our merit procures us the eſteem of men of ſenſe, and our good fortune that of the public.

CCCX.

The appearance of merit is oftener rewarded by the world than merit itſelf.

CCCXI.

Merit has its ſeaſon as well as fruit.

CCCXII.

We ſhould not judge of a man's merit by his great qualities, but by the uſe he makes of them.

CCCXIII.

Cenſorious as the world is, it oftener does favour to falſe merit, than injuſtice to true.

MODERATION.

CCCXIV.

The moderation of happy people is

owing to the calm that good fortune gives to their temper.

CCCXV.

Moderation is the dread of incurring that envy and contempt which attend upon the intoxication of proſperity: it is a vain oſtentation of the ſtrength of the mind. Moderation, in an exalted ſtation, is the deſire of appearing ſuperior to fortune *.

CCCXVI.

We make a virtue of moderation, in order to bound the ambition of great men, and to comfort moderate geniuſes for their ſlender fortune, and their ſlender merit.

CCCXVII.

Moderation reſembles temperance. We are not unwilling to eat more, but are afraid of doing ourſelves harm.

* You have ſo loaded me with honour and riches, that nothing can be wanting to my proſperity, unleſs it be moderation. Any thing more will but excite envy. *Tacit.*

NEGO-

NEGOTIATION.

CCCXVIII.

We are often diſſatisfied with thoſe who negotiate our affairs. The reaſon is, they almoſt always ſacrifice the intereſt of their friends to that of the ſucceſs of the negotiation; this becomes their own intereſt, through the honour they expect for bringing to a concluſion what themſelves have undertaken.

OBSTINACY.

CCCXIX.

Narrowneſs of mind is often the cauſe of obſtinacy: we do not eaſily believe beyond what we ſee *.

OLD-AGE.

CCCXX.

Old-age is a tyrant, which forbids the pleaſures of youth on pain of death.

* Dryden has very juſtly coupled obſtinacy and error:

"Stiff in opinion, always in the wrong."

CCCXXI.

Few people know *how* to be old.

CCCXXII.

Old-age gives good advice, when it is no longer able to give bad example.

OPPORTUNITY.

CCCXXIII.

Opportunities make us known to ourſelves and others.

CCCXXIV.

In affairs of importance we ought leſs to endeavour to make opportunities, than to uſe them when they offer.

CCCXXV.

All our qualities, both good and bad, are uncertain, dubious, and at the mercy of opportunity.

PASSIONS.

CCCXXVI.

The duration of our paſſions is no more in

in our power than the duration of our lives.

CCCXXVII.

Paſſion often makes a fool of a man of ſenſe: ſometimes it makes a man of ſenſe of a fool.

CCCXXVIII.

The paſſions are the only orators that always ſucceed. They are, as it were, Nature's art of eloquence, fraught with infallible rules. Simplicity, with the aid of the paſſions, perſuades more than the utmoſt eloquence without it.

CCCXXIX.

In the heart of man there is a perpetual ſucceſſion of the paſſions; ſo that the deſtruction of one is almoſt always the production of another.

CCCXXX.

Paſſions often beget their oppoſites; avarice produces prodigality, and prodigality avarice: men are often conſtant through weakneſs, and bold through fear.

CCCXXXI.

When we ſubdue our paſſions, it is rather owing to their weakneſs than our ſtrength.

CCCXXXII.

So much injuſtice and ſelf-intereſt enter into the compoſition of the paſſions, that it is very dangerous to obey their dictates; and we ought to be on our guard againſt them even when they ſeem moſt reaſonable.

CCCXXXIII.

Notwithſtanding all the care we take to conceal our paſſions under the pretences of religion and honour, they ſtill appear through the flimſy veil.

CCCXXXIV.

Abſence deſtroys ſmall paſſions, and increaſes great ones; as the wind extinguiſhes tapers, and kindles fires.

CCCXXXV.

We are by no means aware how much we are influenced by our paſſions.

CCCXXXVI.

CCCXXXVI.

While the heart is ſtill agitated by the remains of a paſſion, it is more ſuſceptible of a new one, than when entirely at reſt.

CCCXXXVII.

Thoſe who are during life under the influence of ſtrong paſſions are happy; and miſerable when cured of them *.

PENETRATION.

CCCXXXVIII.

The great fault of penetration is, not the falling ſhort of, but the going beyond its mark.

* Thoſe who would eradicate all hopes and fears out of the human breaſt, as a means of happineſs, are but ill acquainted with the economy of the mind. The inaction and apathy that are the neceſſary attendants on ſuch a ſtate would be greater evils than the moſt unbounded licence of the paſſions.

CCCXXXIX.

CCCXXXIX.

Penetration has an air of divination; it pleaſes our vanity more than any other quality of the mind.

PERSEVERANCE.

CCCXL.

Perſeverance merits neither blame nor praiſe; it is only the duration of our inclinations and ſentiments, which we can neither create nor extinguiſh.

PHILOSOPHERS.

CCCXLI.

The contempt of riches in the philoſophers was a concealed deſire of revenging on fortune the injuſtice done to their merit, by deſpiſing the good ſhe denied them. It was a ſecret to ſhelter them from the ignominy of poverty; a bye-way to arrive at the eſteem they could not procure by wealth *.

PIETY.

* According to Ariſtippus's repartee to Diogenes.

If

PIETY.

CCCXLII.

The piety of old women is often a decent way of eſcaping the diſgrace and ridicule attendant on decayed beauty; an endeavour to continue themſelves upon a reſpectable footing *.

PITY.

CCCXLIII.

Pity is the ſenſe of our own misfortunes in thoſe of another man; it is a wiſe foreſight of the diſaſters that may befal ourſelves: we aſſiſt others, in order to engage them to aſſiſt us on like occaſions; ſo

If Ariſtippus could be content with pulſe, he would not haunt the tables of the great. If Diogenes could keep great men company, he would not live on pulſe.

* It is alſo an employment for them; Mr. Pope has aſſigned them another.

"See how the world its veterans rewards:
"A youth of conqueſts, an *old age of cards.*"

that

that the ſervices we offer to the unfortunate are in reality ſo many anticipated kindneſſes to ourſelves *.

PLEASING.

CCCXLIV.

He who is pleaſed with nobody, is much more unhappy than he with whom nobody is pleaſed.

* "Grief for the calamity of another is pity; "and ariſeth from the imagination that the like ca- "lamity may befal himſelf; and therefore is cal- "led alſo *compaſſion*, and, in the phraſe of this pre- "ſent time, a fellow-feeling; and therefore for ca- "lamity ariſing from great wickedneſs the beſt "men have the leaſt pity: and for the ſame cala- "lamity, thoſe hate pity that think themſelves leaſt "obnoxious to the ſame." Hobbes's Leviathan. And that celebrated ſentence of Terence, *Homo ſum, humani nihil alienum a me puto*, is indeed the ſame opinion, more conciſely and myſteriouſly expreſſed: I am a man and feel for all mankind. *Colman.*

PRIDE.

PRIDE.

CCCXLV.

Pride always indemnifies itſelf; and takes care to be no loſer, even when it renounces vanity.

CCCXLVI.

If we were not proud ourſelves, we ſhould not complain of the pride of others.

CCCXLVII.

Pride is equal in all men; and differs but in the means and manner of ſhewing itſelf.

CCCXLVIII.

It ſeems as if nature, who has ſo wiſely adapted the organs of our bodies to our happineſs, had with the ſame view given us pride, to ſpare us the pain of knowing our imperfections *.

* " And pride beſtow'd on all, a common friend.

CCCXLIX.

CCCXLIX.

Pride is more concerned than benevolence in our remonſtrances to perſons guilty of faults; and we reprove them not ſo much with a deſign to correct, as to make them believe that we ourſelves are free from ſuch failings.

CCCL.

Pride will not owe, and ſelf-love will not pay.

CCCLI.

Our pride is often increaſed by what we retrench from our other faults.

CCCLII.

The ſame pride that makes us condemn the faults we imagine ourſelves exempt from, inclines us to deſpiſe the good qualities we are not poſſeſſed of.

CCCLIII.

There is often more pride than goodneſs in our concern for the misfortunes of our

our enemies. We make them feel our ſuperiority, by ſhewing our compaſſion.

CCCLIV.

Nothing flatters our pride more than the confidence of the great, becauſe we eſteem it the effect of our own merit; not reflecting that it proceeds moſt frequently from their inability to keep a ſecret. So that confidence is ſometimes a relief of mind, throwing off the oppreſſive load of ſecrecy.

CCCLV.

Pride has its caprice, as well as other paſſions; we are aſhamed to own that we are jealous; yet value ourſelves for having been ſo, and for being ſuſceptible of it.

PROBITY.

CCCLVI.

It is difficult to determine, whether a clear, ſincere, and honeſt procedure be the effect of probity or artifice.

PROMISES.

CCCLVII.

We promiſe according to our hopes, and perform according to our fears.

PROPERTIES.

CCCLVIII.

Moſt men, like plants, have ſecret properties, which chance diſcovers.

PRUDENCE.

CCCLIX.

Prudence and love are inconſiſtent; in proportion as the laſt increaſes, the other decreaſes.

CCCLX.

No encomiums are thought too great for prudence; yet cannot it inſure the leaſt event.

PRAISE.

CCCLXI.

The ſhame that ariſes from praiſe which we do not deſerve, often makes us do things we ſhould never otherwiſe have attempted.

CCCLXII.

We ſeldom heartily praiſe any but thoſe who admire us.

CCCLXIII.

We blame ourſelves only to extort praiſe.

CCCLXIV.

We are not fond of praiſing without a view to ſelf-intereſt. Praiſe is an artful concealed refined flattery, which pleaſes very differently the giver and receiver: the one takes it as the reward of his merit, the other gives it to ſhew his candour and diſcernment.

CCCLXV.

We often uſe envenomed praiſe, which,

by a ſide-blow, expoſes, in the perſon we commend, ſuch faults as we durſt not any other way lay open *.

CCCLXVI.

We ſeldom praiſe but to be praiſed.

CCCLXVII.

Few are ſo wiſe as to prefer uſeful reproof to treacherous praiſe †.

CCCLXVIII.

A refuſal of praiſe is a deſire to be praiſed twice.

CCCLXIX.

There are reproaches that praiſe, and praiſes that reproach ‡.

* Panegyriſts are the moſt dangerous enemies. *Tacit.*

† Vitellius might have known the truth from the old officers, but his courtiers kept them off: having accuſtomed him not to hear any thing diſagreeable, though uſeful; but to liſten to every thing pleaſing and pernicious. *Id.*

‡ Pliny relates of Cæſar, that he blamed in ſo artful a manner, that he ſeemed to praiſe. *Id.*

CCCLXX.

CCCLXX.

That modeſty which ſeems to decline praiſe, is only the deſire of being praiſed more delicately.

CCCLXXI.

Ambition to merit praiſe fortifies our virtue. Praiſe beſtowed on wit, valour, and beauty, contributes to their augmentation.

QUALITIES.

CCCLXXII.

Our bad actions expoſe us not to ſo much perſecution and hatred as our good qualities *.

CCCLXXIII.

It is not enough to have great qualities;

* The world is apt to judge unfavourably of eminent merit; and a great reputation is as dangerous as a bad one. *Tacit.*

we muſt alſo have the management of them *

CCCLXXIV.

There are ſome good qualities which, when natural, degenerate into faults; and others which, when acquired, are always imperfect. For example, reaſon muſt teach us to be frugal of our fortune and our confidence; and, on the contrary, nature muſt give us benevolence and valour.

CCCLXXV.

It is with ſome good qualities as with the ſenſes; they are incomprehenſible and inconceivable to ſuch as are deprived of them.

* Brutidius was poſſeſſed of good qualities ſufficient to have raiſed him to the higheſt dignities, had he not through precipitation quitted the uſual track; labouring to outſtrip firſt his equals, then his ſuperiors: a rock on which many worthy men have ſplit; while they ſtrove at the greateſt hazard to obtain prematurely, what with a little patience they would have had with perfect ſafety. *Tacit.*

CCCLXXVI.

CCCLXXVI.

Naturally to be without envy is a certain indication of great qualities.

CCCLXXVII.

There are bad qualities which conſtitute great talents.

QUARRELS.

CCCLXXVIII.

Quarrels would never laſt long, if the fault was on one ſide only.

RAILLERY.

CCCLXXIX.

Raillery is more inſupportable than wrong; becauſe we have a right to reſent injuries, but it is ridiculous to be angry at a jeſt.

REASON.

CCCLXXX.

We want ſtrength to act up to our reaſon.

CCCLXXXI.

CCCLXXXI.

A man is not rational becauſe chance throws reaſon in his way: he only is rational who knows, diſtinguiſhes, taſtes it.

CCCLXXXII.

We never deſire ardently what we deſire rationally.

RECONCILIATION.

CCCLXXXIII.

Reconciliation with enemies is owing to a deſire of bettering our condition; the fatigue of war, and an apprehenſion of ſome untoward event.

REPENTANCE.

CCCLXXXIV.

Repentance is not ſo much remorſe for what we have done, as the fear of conſequences.

REPUTATION.

CCCLXXXV.

We except to judges in affairs of ſmall moment,

moment, but are content that our reputation and glory ſhould be dependent on the judgment of men who are all againſt us, through jealouſy, prejudice, or want of diſcernment: yet it is merely to engage theſe to determine in our favour that we often hazard our eaſe and lives.

CCCLXXXVI.

Whatever ignominy we may have incurred, it is almoſt always in our power to re-eſtabliſh our reputation *.

RICHES.

CCCLXXXVII.

Many people deſpiſe riches; yet few know how to beſtow them.

* Particularly by a generous death: as Tacitus ſays of Sempronius: Though he had degenerated from his great anceſtors by a diſorderly life, he rendered himſelf worthy of them by his conſtancy in death.

CCCLXXXVIII.

CCCLXXXVIII.

Ridicule diſhonours more than diſhonour itſelf *.

SECRETS.

CCCLXXXIX.

How can we expect that another ſhould keep our ſecrets, when it is more than we can do ourſelves †?

SELF-LOVE.

CCCXC.

Self-love is more artful than the moſt artful of men.

CCCXCI.

Self-love is the greateſt of flatterers.

CCCXCII.

The firſt impulſe of joy we feel from the

* "Ridicule excites contempt and laughter, but "can never be a detector of falſehood, or a teſt of "truth." Brown againſt Shafteſb.

† See Maxim CCCLIV.

good

good fortune of a friend proceeds neither from our good-nature, nor friendſhip; it is the effect of ſelf-love, which flatters us either with the hope of being happy in our turn, or of making ſome advantage of his proſperity.

CCCXCIII.

Self-love, well or ill conducted, conſtitutes virtue and vice.

CCCXCIV.

Human prudence, rightly underſtood, is circumſpect enlightened ſelf-love.

CCCXCV.

We are ſo prepoſſeſſed in our own favour, that we often miſtake for virtues thoſe vices that have ſome reſemblance to them, and which are artfully diſguiſed by ſelf-love.

CCCXCVI.

Notwithſtanding all the diſcoveries that have been made in the regions of ſelf-love, there ſtill remains much *terra incognita*.

CCCXCVII.

CCCXCVII.

The fondneſs, or indifference for life, in the old philoſophers, was a taſte of their ſelf-love; which ought no more to be controverted than the taſte of the palate, or the choice of colours.

CCCXCVIII.

Nothing is ſo capable of diminiſhing our ſelf-love, as the obſervation that we diſapprove at one time of what we approve at another.

CCCXCIX.

Self-love never reigns ſo abſolutely as in the paſſion of love: we are always ready to ſacrifice the peace of thoſe we adore, rather than loſe the leaſt part of our own.

CCCC.

The ſelf-love of ſome people is ſuch, that, when in love, they are more taken up with their paſſion than its object.

CCCCI.

Self-love is the love of ſelf, and of every thing

thing for the ſake of ſelf. Self-love makes men idolize themſelves, and tyrannize over others, when fortune gives the means *. He never reſts out of himſelf; and

* Self-love.] Self-love is the ſpring of all animal action. It is implanted by nature in animals with a twofold view; the good of the individual, and that of the ſpecies: and operates on them by a twofold impulſe; an inſupportable uneaſineſs attendant on its ſuppreſſion, and a pleaſurable ſenſation annexed to its gratification. In brutes, this motive to action, being under the ſole direction of inſtinct, is in general uniform and evident. In man, inſtinct has been ſuperadded to reaſon, and ſelf-love becomes complex and myſterious. It is plain from fact, that all animals are in ſome degree ſocial; ſome of them, (if we may ſo ſpeak) live under monarchial, ſome oligarchal, others democratical, and the reſt patriarchal government. The ſtifling, or exerting, the principle that thus unites them, has always its concomitant pain or pleaſure. And inſtinct, where ſhe is ſole governeſs, impells them invariably and unerringly to nature's end and their own good; which are always united, though not always abſolutely the ſame. For example, animals eat to appeaſe their hunger, or pleaſe their palate; they have no more view to ſuſtenance than the ſexes, in their intercourſe, have

and ſettles on external things, juſt as the bee doth on flowers, to extract what may be ſerviceable. Nothing is ſo impetuous as

to propagation. Men too, ſo far as they act under inſtinct, act unerringly; when that leaves them, they have recourſe to reaſon; which not being at all times, nor in all perſons, equally right and ſtrong, does not always prompt to what is equally true and juſt. Society is undoubtedly the intereſt of all mankind; and though an univerſal government has never yet been, nor moſt probably ever will be, formed, yet the wants of every man make him confederate with, and join himſelf to, ſome particular public. Now, as in order to the eſtabliſhment of a ſtate it is indiſpenſibly neceſſary to ſuperſede ſome private rights, which are indeed compenſated reflectively, though in a leſs obvious manner, this ſeems to produce caſes wherein the good of the government and that of the ſubject claſh. And certainly there are occaſionally inſtances where the neceſſities of the commonwealth bear ſo hard on particular members as would give them a diſtaſte to ſociety, did not the uniting principle, the love of the ſpecies, the affection for the community of which they are part, lighten the oppreſſion, ſtill the grievance, and, by benevolent reflection, even render it pleaſurable. To actions deduced from this ſource, the ſelf-love of the reſt of the community (which

as his deſires, nothing ſo ſecret as his deſigns, nothing ſo artful as his conduct. His ſuppleneſs is inexpreſſible, his metamorphoſes ſurpaſs thoſe of Ovid, and his refinements thoſe of chymiſtry. We cannot fathom the depth, nor penetrate the obſcurity of his abyſs. There concealed from the moſt piercing eye, he makes

(which reaps the benefit of theſe ſeeming ſelf-ſacrifices) aſcribes extraordinary merit, annexes attendant glory, and calls them virtuous; which virtue, though, relatively to the kind, it be highly meritorious, is yet not diſintereſted, becauſe repaid by the reflex pleaſure of the actor: and may alſo be carried ſo far as to become irrational and vicious; for, "to be "virtuous," ſays Lord Shafteſbury, "is to have "one's affections right in reſpect to one's ſelf as well "as of ſociety." So that virtue will be found to be, not a diſintereſted benevolence toward the ſpecies, but a love of that kind which is its own reward; not a boundleſs enthuſiaſm for the public, but the ſocial affection conducted by reaſon. It is rational humanity; it is, according to our author, *well regulated ſelf-love*: And thus,

"True ſelf-love and ſocial are the ſame."

Pope's Eſſay on Man, Ep. iv.

numberleſs turnings and windings: there is he often inviſible even to himſelf: there he conceives, breeds, and brings up, without being ſenſible of it, an infinity of likes and diſlikes; ſome of which are ſo monſtrous, that he knows them not when brought into light, or at leaſt cannot prevail on himſelf to own them. From the night that invelopes him ſprings the ridiculous notions he entertains of himſelf: thence his errors, his ignorance, his groſs and ſilly miſtakes with reſpect to himſelf. Thence is it that he imagines his ſenſations dead, when they are only aſleep; that he ſhall never deſire to run again when once tired; and that he has loſt all the appetites he has ſated. But this thick darkneſs, which hides him from himſelf, hinders him not from ſeeing perfectly well whatever is without him; in which he reſembles the eye, that ſees all things except itſelf. In his great concerns and important affairs, where the violence of deſire ſummoneth his whole attention, he ſees, perceives, underſtands, invents, ſuſpects, penetrates

penetrates, and divines all things; ſo that one would be tempted to believe that each paſſion had its reſpective magic. Nothing is ſo cloſe and ſtrong as his attachments; which he in vain attempts to break through on diſcovery of the greateſt impending miſery. Yet ſometimes, in a ſhort time, he effects, and without trouble, what he had not been able to compaſs with the greateſt efforts for years. Whence may well be concluded, that it is by himſelf that his deſires are inflamed, more than by the beauty and merit of their objects; that it is his taſte that heightens and embelliſhes them; that it is himſelf that he purſues; and that he follows his inclination, when he follows things that are agreeable to his inclination. He is compoſed of contrarieties; imperious and obedient; ſincere and hypocritical, merciful and cruel, timid and bold. He has different inclinations, according to the different tempers that poſſeſs and devote him, ſometimes to glory, ſometimes to wealth, ſometimes to pleaſure. Theſe he

changes, as age and experience alter: and it is indifferent to him whether he has many inclinations, or only one; becauſe he can ſplit himſelf into many, or collect himſelf into one, as it is convenient or agreeable to him. He is inconſtant: and the changes, beſides thoſe that happen from external cauſes, are numberleſs which proceed from himſelf. He is inconſtant through levity, through love, through novelty, through ſatiety, through diſguſt, through inconſtancy itſelf. He is capricious: and ſometimes labours with eagerneſs and incredible pains to obtain things that are no ways advantageous, nay, even hurtful; but which he purſues merely becauſe it is his will. He is whimſical, and often exerts his whole application in employments the moſt trifling; takes the utmoſt delight in the moſt inſipid, and preſerves all his haughtineſs in the moſt contemptible. He is attendant on all ages and conditions; he lives every where; he lives on every thing; he lives

lives on nothing. He makes himſelf eaſy either in the enjoyment, or privation of things; he even goes over to thoſe who are at variance with him; he enters into their ſchemes, and, which is wonderful! along with them hates himſelf; he conſpires his own deſtruction; he labours to undo himſelf; he only deſires to BE; and, that granted, he conſents to be his own enemy. We are not therefore to be ſurpriſed if he ſometimes cloſes with the moſt rigid auſterity; and enters boldly into a combination therewith to ruin himſelf; becauſe what he loſes in one place he regains in another. When we think he relinquiſhes his pleaſures, he but ſuſpends, or changes them: and even when he is diſcomfited, and we think we are rid of him, we find him triumphant in his own defeat. Such is ſelf-love; of which man's life is only a long and great agitation. The ſea is its repreſentative: in the flux and reflux of whoſe waves, ſelf-love may find a lively ex-

expreſſion of the turbulent ſucceſſion of its thoughts, and of its eternal motion.

SENSATIONS.

CCCCII.

It is leſs difficult to feign the ſenſations we have not, than to conceal thoſe we have.

SIMPLICITY.

CCCCIII.

Affected ſimplicity is refined impoſture*.

SINCERITY.

CCCCIV.

Sincerity is an openneſs of heart which is rarely to be found. It is commonly

* Domitian, under the maſk of ſimplicity and modeſty, affected the love of letters and poetry, the better to conceal his deſigns, and avoid his brother's jealouſy. *Tacit.*

per-

perſonated by a refined diſſimulation, whoſe end is to procure confidence.

CCCCV.

A deſire to talk of ourſelves, and to ſet our faults in whatever light we chuſe, makes the main of our ſincerity.

SLANDER.

CCCCVI.

We commonly ſlander more through vanity than malice.

SOBRIETY.

CCCCVII.

Sobriety is either the love of health, or an incapacity for debauch.

SOCIETY.

CCCCVIII.

Men would not live long in ſociety, were they not the mutual dupes of each other.

SOUL.

SOUL.

CCCCIX.

The health of the ſoul is as precarious as that of the body; for when we ſeem ſecure from paſſions, we are no leſs in danger of their infection, than we are of falling ill, when we appear to be well.

CCCCX.

There are relapſes in the diſtempers of the ſoul, as well as in thoſe of the body: thus we often miſtake for a cure what is no more than an intermiſſion, or a change of diſeaſe.

CCCCXI.

The flaws of the ſoul reſemble the wounds of the body; the ſcar always appears, and they are in danger of breaking open again.

SUBTILTY.

CCCCXII.

Too great ſubtilty is falſe delicacy; and true delicacy is ſolid ſubtilty.

TALKA-

TALKATIVENESS.

CCCCXIII.

We ſpeak little when vanity prompts us not.

CCCCXIV.

As it is the characteriſtic of great wits to ſay much in few words, ſo ſmall wits ſeem to have the gift of ſpeaking much and ſaying nothing.

CCCCXV.

The exceſſive pleaſure we find in talking of ourſelves ought to make us apprehenſive that it gives but little to our auditors.

CCCCXVI.

We know that we ſhould not talk of our wives; but we ſeem not to know that we ſhould talk ſtill leſs of ourſelves.

CCCCXVII.

We had rather ſpeak ill of ourſelves than not ſpeak at all.

CCCCXVIII.

CCCCXVIII.

It is never more difficult to ſpeak well than when we are aſhamed of our ſilence.

TASTE.

CCCCXIX.

It is as common for men to change their taſte, as it is uncommon for them to change their inclination.

CCCCXX.

A good taſte is the effect of judgment more than underſtanding.

CCCCXXI.

We give up our intereſt ſooner than our taſte.

CCCCXXII.

Our taſte declines with our merit.

CCCCXXIII.

Our ſelf-love bears with leſs patience the condemnation of our taſte than of our opinion.

TITLES.

CCCCXXIV.

Titles, inſtead of exalting, debaſe thoſe who act not up to them.

TREACHERY.

CCCCXXV.

Men are oftener treacherous through weakneſs than deſign.

TRUTH.

CCCCXXVI.

Truth is not ſo beneficial to men as its appearances are prejudicial.

CCCCXXVII.

Our enemies, in their judgment of us, come nearer the truth than we do ourſelves.

VALOUR.

CCCCXXVIII.

The love of glory, the fear of ſhame,

the deſign of making a fortune, the deſire of rendering life eaſy and agreeable, and the humour of pulling down other people, are often the cauſes of that valour ſo celebrated among men.

CCCCXXIX.

Valour in private ſoldiers is a hazardous trade taken up to get a livelihood.

CCCCXXX.

Perfect valour and perfect cowardice are extremes men ſeldom arrive at. The intermediate ſpace is prodigious, and contains all the different ſpecies of courage, which are as various as mens faces and humours. There are thoſe who expoſe themſelves boldly at the beginning of an action; and who ſlacken and are diſheartened at its duration. There are others who aim only at preſerving their honour, and do little more. Some are not equally exempt from fear at all times alike. Others give occaſionally into a general panic: others advance to the charge becauſe they dare not ſtay in their poſts. There are men

men whom habitual ſmall dangers encourage, and fit for greater. Some are brave with the ſword, and fear bullets: others defy bullets, and dread a ſword. All theſe different kinds of valour agree in this, that night, as it augments fear, ſo it conceals good or bad actions, and gives every one the opportunity of ſparing himſelf. There is alſo another more general diſcretion: for we find thoſe who do moſt, would do more ſtill, were they ſure of coming off ſafe: ſo that it is very plain that the fear of death gives a damp to courage *.

CCCCXXXI.

Perfect valour conſiſts in doing without witneſſes all we ſhould be capable of doing before the whole world.

CCCCXXXII.

Moſt men ſufficiently expoſe themſelves in war to ſave their honour, but few ſo much as is neceſſary even to ſucceed in the deſign for which they thus expoſe themſelves.

* Valour is the contempt of death and pain.

CCCCXXXIII.

No man can anſwer for his courage who has never been in danger.

CCCCXXXIV.

A wiſe man had rather avoid an engagement than conquer.

VANITY.

CCCCXXXV.

It is our own vanity that makes the vanity of others intolerable.

CCCCXXXVI.

If vanity really overturns not the virtues, it certainly makes them totter.

CCCCXXXVII.

The moſt violent paſſions have their intermiſſions: vanity alone gives us no reſpite.

CCCCXXXVIII.

The reaſon why the pangs of ſhame and

and jealouſy are ſo ſharp, is this; vanity gives us no aſſiſtance in ſupporting them.

CCCCXXXIX.

Vanity makes us do more things againſt inclination than reaſon.

VICE.

CCCCXL.

When our vices have left us, we flatter ourſelves that *we* have left *them* *.

CCCCXLI.

Vices enter into the compoſition of virtues, as poiſons into the compoſition of medicines. Prudence mixes and tempers, and makes good uſe of the compound againſt the ills of life.

CCCCXLII.

The reaſon we are not often wholly poſ-

* The vices wait for us through life, like hoſts with whom we are obliged ſucceſſively to lodge; and it is uncertain whether experience would make us avoid them, were we twice to take the ſame journey.

ſeſſed by a ſingle vice, is, that we are diſtracted by ſeveral.

VIOLENCE.

CCCCXLIII.

The violence done us by others is often leſs painful than that we do to ourſelves.

CCCCXLIV.

The violence we do ourſelves in order to prevent love is often more rigorous than the cruelty of a miſtreſs.

VIRTUE.

CCCCXLV.

Our virtues are commonly diſguiſed vices.

CCCCXLVI.

What we miſtake for virtue is often no more than a concurrence of divers actions and intereſts, which fortune, or induſtry, diſpoſes to advantage. It is not always from the principles of valour and chaſtity that

that men are valiant, and that women are chaſte.

CCCCXLVII.

Proſperity is a ſtronger trial of virtue than adverſity *.

CCCCXLVIII.

The virtues are loſt in intereſt, as rivers are in the ſea.

CCCCXLIX.

To the honour of virtue it muſt be acknowledged, that the greateſt misfortunes befal men from their vices.

CCCCL.

We deſpiſe not all thoſe who have vices; but we deſpiſe all thoſe who have no virtues.

CCCCLI.

Nature ſeems to have preſcribed to every

* Proſperity is the touchſtone of virtue; for it is leſs difficult to bear misfortunes than to remain uncorrupted by pleaſure. *Tacit.*

man

man at his birth the bounds both of his virtues and vices.

CCCCLII.

Virtue would not go ſo far, if vanity did not bear her company *.

CCCCLIII.

Men dare not, as bad as they are, appear open enemies to virtue: when therefore they perſecute virtue they pretend to think it counterfeit, or elſe lay ſome crime to its charge.

VOGUE.

CCCCLIV.

There are people, who, like new ſongs, are in vogue only for a time.

UNDERSTANDING.

CCCCLV.

Thoſe are miſtaken who imagine wit

* Take from men ambition and vanity, and you will have neither heroes nor patriots. *Senec.*

and

and judgment to be two diſtinct things. Judgment is only the perfection of wit, which penetrates into the receſſes of things, obſerves all that merits obſervation, and perceives what ſeems imperceptible. We muſt therefore agree, that it is extenſive wit which produces all the effects attributed to judgment.

CCCCLVI.

Strength and weakneſs of mind are improper terms; they are in reality only the good or ill diſpoſition of the organs of the body.

CCCCLVII.

It is a common fault to be never ſatisfied with our fortune, nor diſſatisfied with our underſtanding.

CCCCLVIII.

Politeneſs of mind conſiſts in a courteous and delicate conception.

CCCCLIX.

The gallantry of the mind conſiſts in flattering agreeably.

CCCCLX.

CCCCLX.

It often happens that things preſent themſelves to our minds more finiſhed than we could make them with much labour.

CCCCLXI.

The defects of the mind, like thoſe of the face, grow worſe as we grow old.

CCCCLXII.

A man of wit would be often at a loſs, were it not for the company of fools.

CCCCLXIII.

It is a better employment of the underſtanding to bear the misfortunes that actually befal us, than to penetrate into thoſe that may.

CCCCLXIV.

It is not ſo much through a fertility of invention that we find many expedients in any one affair; as through a poverty of judgment, which makes us liſten to every thing that imagination preſents, and hinders us from diſcerning what is beſt at firſt.

CCCCLXV.

Vivacity, when it increaſes with age, is not far ſhort of phrenzy.

CCCCLXVI.

Thoſe who have but one ſort of wit are ſure not to pleaſe long.

CCCCLXVII.

Wit tempts us ſometimes to play the fool with great courage *.

CCCCLXVIII.

A man of ſenſe finds leſs difficulty in ſubmitting to a wrong-headed fellow than in attempting to ſet him right.

CCCCLXIX.

The labours of the body free men from

* "Vivacity and wit make a man ſhine in company; but trite jokes and loud laughter reduce him to a buffoon." Cheſterf. Lett. (134th).

pains

pains of the mind. This it is that conſtitutes the happineſs of the poor *.

CCCCLXX.

The mind, between idleneſs and conſtancy, fixes on what is eaſy and agreeable to it. This habit always ſets bounds to our inquiries. No man was ever at the trouble to ſtretch his genius as far as it would go.

CCCCLXXVI.

Small geniuſes are hurt by ſmall events:

* "It is certain that as in the body, when no "labour of natural exerciſe is uſed, the ſpirits, "which want their due employment, turn againſt "the conſtitution, and find work for themſelves in "a deſtructive way; ſo in a ſoul or mind, unexer-"ciſed, and which languiſhes for want of action "and employment, the thoughts and affections, "being obſtructed in their due courſe, and deprived "of their natural energy, raiſe diſquiet, and "foment a rancourous eagerneſs and tormenting "irritation. The temper from hence becomes "more impotent in paſſion, more incapable of real "moderation, and, like prepared fuel, readily "takes fire by the leaſt ſpark." Shafteſbury, vol. II. p. 160.

great

great geniuſes ſee through and deſpiſe them.

UNTRUTH.

CCCCLXXII.

Our averſion to untruth is often but an imperceptible ambition to make our teſtimony conſiderable, and to give our words a religious weight.

WEAKNESS.

CCCCLXXIII.

Weakneſs is the only incorrigible fault men have *.

* It is however a fault of nature, for which a man ſeems to be no more blameable than a veſſel is for being leaky.

Lord Cheſterfield obſerves, that men are more unwilling to have their weakneſſes and imperfections known than their crimes: and that if you hint to a man that you think him ignorant, ſilly, or even ill-bred or awkward, he will hate you more and longer than if you tell him plainly you think him a rogue.

Lett. 129.

CCCCLXXIV.

Weakneſs is more oppoſite to virtue than is vice itſelf.

CCCCLXXV.

Weak people are incapable of ſincerity.

CCCCLXXVI.

More men are guilty of treaſon through weakneſs than any ſtudied deſign to betray.

CCCCLXXVII.

If there be a man whoſe weak ſide has never been diſcovered, it is only becauſe we have never accurately looked for it *.

* Lord Cheſterfield ſays, that every body has a prevailing weakneſs; that Cardinal Richelieu, the ableſt ſtateſman, had the idle vanity to be thought the beſt poet too; that Sir Robert Walpole's prevailing weakneſs was to be thought to have a polite and happy turn to gallantry, of which he had undoubtedly leſs than any man living; and that thoſe who had any penetration applied to it with ſucceſs. Lett. 97.

CCCCLXXVIII.

CCCCLXXVIII.

Silence is the happieſt courſe a man can take who is diffident of himſelf.

WEARINESS.

CCCCLXXIX.

The reaſon why lovers are never weary of one another is this, they are always talking of themſelves.

CCCCLXXX.

We often boaſt that we are never out of ſpirits; and yet are too much conceited to own that we are not bad company.

CCCCLXXXI.

We often forgive thoſe who tire us, but cannot forgive thoſe whom we tire.

CCCCLXXXII.

We are almoſt always tired with the company of thoſe very perſons of whom we ought never to be tired.

WILL.

CCCCLXXXIII.

We have more power than will; and it is only to diſculpate us to ourſelves, that we often think things impracticable *.

WISDOM.

CCCCLXXXIV.

Man's chief wiſdom conſiſts in knowing his follies.

CCCCLXXXV.

Our wiſdom is no leſs at fortune's mercy than our wealth.

CCCCLXXXVI.

It is eaſier to be wiſe for others than for ourſelves †.

* Our lazineſs perſuades us that thoſe things are impracticable which we might eaſily accompliſh. *Tacit.*

† Gods! that the nature of mankind is ſuch,
To ſee and judge of the affairs of others
Much better than their own! Is't therefore ſo,
Becauſe that in our own concerns we feel
Th' influence of joy and grief too nearly?
Terent.

CCCCLXXXVII.

CCCCLXXXVII.

Wiſdom is to the mind what health is to the body.

WOMAN.

CCCCLXXXVIII.

Women affect coyneſs as an addition to their beauty.

CCCCLXXXIX.

Women often fancy themſelves to be in love when they are not. The amuſement of an intrigue, the emotion of mind produced by gallantry, their natural paſſion for being beloved, and their unwillingneſs to give a denial; all theſe make them imagine they are in love, when in fact they are only coquetting.

CCCCXC.

Women are completely cruel only to thoſe they hate.

CCCCXCI.

The wit of moſt women ſerves rather to fortify their folly than their reaſon*.

CCCCXCII.

* "Women have an entertaining tattle, and "ſometimes wit; but for ſolid reaſoning and good

cccexcii.

The virtue of women is often the love of reputation and quiet.

cccexciii.

There are few virtuous women who are not weary of their profeſſion.

cccexciv.

Moſt virtuous women, like hidden treaſures, are ſecure becauſe nobody ſeeks after them.

cccexcv.

Youth without beauty is of as little conſequence as beauty without youth.

cccexcvi.

The common foible of women who *have been* handſome, is to forget that they are now no longer ſo *.

cccexcvii.

" ſenſe, I never knew one in my life that had it, " or who reaſoned and acted conſequentially for " four and twenty hours together."

Ld. Cheſterf. Lett. 129.

* " Every woman who is not abſolutely ugly " thinks herſelf handſome. The ſuſpicion of age no " woman, let her be ever ſo old, ever forgives. No " flattery is either too high or too low for them. " They will greedily ſwallow the higheſt, and

" gratefully

CCCCXCVII.

Moſt women yield more through weakneſs than paſſion; whence it happens that enterpriſing, rather than amiable men, commonly ſucceed beſt with them *.

CCCCXCVIII.

Of all the violent paſſions that which leaſt miſbecomes a woman is love.

" gratefully accept of the loweſt; and you may ſafely
" flatter any woman, from her underſtanding down
" to the e quiſite taſte of her fan."
Ld. Cheſterf. Lett. 129, 181.

* " Whenever the ſlighteſt wiſhes ariſe," ſays Lord Cheſterfield, " the reſt will ſoon follow." Again, " If you are not liſtened to the firſt time, try a
" ſecond, a third, and a fourth. If the place is not
" already taken, depend upon it it may be con-
" quered." Lett. 218, 224.

It is difficult to ſay whether our author or Lord Cheſterfield has been hardeſt upon the ſex. His Lordſhip however (among other douceurs) acknowledges, " that women are the only refiners of the me-
" rit of men; that it is true they cannot add weight,
" but they poliſh and give a luſtre to it; that they
" abſolutely ſtamp every man's character in the
" *beau monde*, and make it either current, or cry it
" down, and ſtop it in payments." Lett. 129.—218.

CCCCXCIX.

cccexcix.

In their firſt deſires women love the lover, afterwards the paſſion.

ccccc.

That woman is much to be pitied who at once poſſeſſes both love and virtue.

YOUTH.

ccccci.

Youth changes its inclinations through heat of blood; old age perſeveres in it through habit.

ccccii.

Youth is continual intoxication. It is the fever of reaſon.

ccccciii.

Young people at their entrance upon the world ſhould be either baſhful or giddy; a compoſed ſelf-ſufficiency generally turns to impertinence.

ccccciv.

Timidity is a fault dangerous to reprehend in thoſe we would reform.

THE END.

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FINIS.